REVIEW and OUTLOOK

A Lesson From the U-2

Since just about everybody is drawing lessons from the U-2 affair these 'days, we would like to offer one. That is that in the affairs of nations as in the affairs of men "pushing things too far! is a treacherous business.

That was the mistake of Khrushchev. At Paris he lost all that he might have gained from the uneasiness the incident aroused among our allies by trying to make out Russia as Innocent Nell and the United States as a wicked cgre. The President's political critics at home have also not been content with scolding the Administration for ineptness, which might have scored them some political points; they have pushed on to blame just about everything that's happened abroad on the handling of the U-2.

Only last week, for example, Senator Fulbright spoiled some otherwise thoughtful comments on the affair with the contention that the "essential point" is that "the U-2 is the reason" Mr. Khrushchev wrecked the Summit. This is such patent nonsense that nobody is apt to swallow it.

The real mistake the Administration made in that business, it seems to us, was in the untenable way it tried to justify what it did. And properly recognized that mistake can offer a valuable. lesson for the United States in the fu-

The big mustake lay not in spying on Russia or necessarily even in sending planes flying over the country to do so, although that is a dangerous procedure Nor even in the dissembling about it, although that would better have been a pided. Nor, when put to it, frankly saying, "Yes, we have been spying.

For it is profoundly true that the necessities of this world make espionage imperative and it is iplitting hairs to say one rathed is "right" and another "wryng". Furthermore, every nation in the world repognizes this imperative; whicher their statesmen say publicly, privately they understand and, rather than being incenses at the U-2, would make at its success.

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was that the State Department on to this as a premise, then pushed on to declare that not only were over-flights" dictated by necessity but that we claimed the privilege of making them as a matter of right. And not in the past only, but alights the furnire. This may seem like a subtle distinc-tion, but it was a mistake becomes it put the United States in an untenable

position, a thing proved by the fact that we were formed to abandon it.

Here Senator Fulbright's analogy is apt. If a starving man steals, his justification lies in the imperative of survival; few of us would hesitate to act on it. But his justification must be that alone; it cannot be converted into a claim that burglary is in itself right. For that becomes a kind of moral juggling that the world will not accept.

Recognising that distinction, how-ever subtle, will let us keep the whole business of the U-2, and spying in general, in a proper perspective. And if we remember it, it will stand in good stead in the future.

For it may well happen that the realities of the world may someday a trary to all that we stand for or specific to others. For example, we do not be lieve in forcible interference with the internal affairs of other national ference with the conceivable event in a national secondary stand accountry stand to not believe in.

If such a national for arises, let us act to the conceivable and the not believe in.

on it. But we can learn one lesson from the U-2. Our justification for the act is our setety; that and nothing more. Even then people may debate the necessity for the dead, or its timing, or the adroitness of what is done. But these are quarrels of judgment only, and we will not be put in the untenable position of claiming the privilege to do what we would exceriate in others.

Because we are civilized, it is difficult for us to live by the laws of a jungle. Yet if we must, then we will do better to understand and to say frankly that in the affairs of nations, as in the affairs of men, there are some deeds to be done simply because survival is the first (shpensifes

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